Abstract. The human-centred security research area came into being about fifteen years ago, as more and more people started owning their own computers, and it became clear that there was a need for more focus on the non-specialist computer user. The primary attitude fifteen years ago, in terms of how these new users were concerned, was one of exasperation and paternalism. The term "stupid user" was often heard, often muttered sotto voce by an IT specialist dealing with the aftermath of a security incident. A great deal of research has been published in this area, and after pursuing some unfruitful avenues a number of eminent researchers have started to focus on the end-user's perceptions and understandings. This has come from a realisation that end users are not the opponents, but rather allies in the battle against those carrying out nefarious activities. The most promising research direction currently appears to be to focus on mental models, a concept borrowed from the respected and long-standing field of Psychology and, in particular, cognitive science. The hope is that if we understand the end-user and his/her comprehension of security better, we will be able to design security solutions and interactions more effectively. In this paper we review the research undertaken in this area so far, highlight the limitations thereof, and suggest directions for future research.
Introduction
Over the last few years a number of different security mechanisms have been developed in order to protect users from different kinds of attacks eg. the SSL/TLS protocol. Some of these mechanisms have been formally proven to be secure and evaluated based on international security standards such as the Common Criteria or ISO 27001. However, a number of user studies [82, 95] , as well as the prevalence of attacks [61] successfully targeting the human end-user, demonstrate that many of these security mechanisms falter and fail as soon as the user is involved in the process. One big problem is the large number of security warnings users are confronted with. Users are habituated into ignoring these since they do not understand and thus perceive any risk [94] .
This can either be attributed to the 'stupidity' of the user (not understanding what is secure and what is not) or the 'obtuseness' of the developers (not designing systems properly and not giving due consideration to the non-security related nature of the end-user's primary goal or task). As a solution, one could try to eliminate the end-user from the security mechanism's operation altogether. While this might work in a few cases (eg. virus scanners and firewalls), there are many contexts in which this is not advisable, for many reasons, as discussed in the paper 'Security Automation Considered Harmful? ' [40] . For instance, in some cases eliminating the user could restrict functionality to such an extent that users will reject the mechanism (e.g. preventing users from visiting https web servers which do not possess extended validation certificates). There are also applications where user input is mandated by law. For example, the user has to be able to verify the correct processing of their vote when voting electronically.
Instead of eliminating the user altogether, one could try to force users to behave securely by defining corresponding policies or (long) lists of security and privacy rules and guidelines and try to compel the user to comply. In some cases users are punished for non-compliance, or at least threatened with sanctions [53]. This does not really work very well, at least in the way policies are designed nowadays [88] . For instance, policies often forbid actions that human nature almost compels eg. password sharing between colleagues in order to perform the primary goal/task effectively. Wash and Rader [106] argue against all these options. It is far better, argue Wash and Rader and other researchers [106, 19, 5, 1] , for developers to align necessary security-specific user interactions, educational endeavours and risk communication efforts with users' mental models and capabilities. Users' actions and decisions are directed by their mental models so it is crucial for designers and developers to know and understand their models when developing and designing security mechanisms. The design should be aligned with the end-users' mental models but not, as is nowadays often the case, purely with the developers' and designers' mental models and based on their assumptions about end-users' mental models and capabilities. Risk communication, particularly, can only be effective if it does not only depend on the nature of the risk but also on the alignment between the conceptual model embedded in the risk communication and the users' mental model(s) related to the context and reality of the risk. Risk communication is an important aspect of Human-Centered Security as it is implicit in each warning.
Mental models also influence trust and acceptance of technology: An incorrect mental model can make users mistrust insecure technologies [21] . This constitutes yet another reason for paying attention to end users' mental models.
In this paper we focus on aligning interactions and risk communication with the users' mental models. The first goal of this paper is to provide security
